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There are more than two million refu-
gees in Russia, most of whom are in
Moscow, St. Petersburg, the Krasnodar,
Stavropol and Rostov regions. Even in
the Siberian Altai region there are about
20,000 refugees roaming the Kulunda
steppe in search of help. They have come
from Central Asia, Transcaucasia,
Tatarstan, Tula, Buryatia, Bashkiria and
Yakutia. About 90 percent are Russians
and the others are Germans, Ossetians,
Kazakhs and Moldovans.
In the vast territoryofwhat used tobe
the SovietUnionand its satellites, there is
clearpotentialfor manyYugoslavia-type
civil wars. Many of these countries share
the preconditions for armed conflict: the
coliapse of strong central authority, eco-
nomic crises, persistent violations of mi-
nority rights, border disputes and very
limited experience with democracy.
A profound economic crisis plays a
significant role in intensifying social and
ethnicconflicts. In the fiJ;st quarter of1992
alone, the Russian economy declined by
14 percent. An opinion poli conducted
by a sociologist, Boris Grushin, in the
Russian Federation, produced the fol-
lowing results: 80 percent of the people
felt that life was better before perestroika
than now; 67 percent of the respondents
favoured socialism; and 50 percent of the
respondents (predominantly older peo-
pie) have favourable thoughts about Sta-
lin.1 Under these conditions, patriotic
and nationalist forces are gaining more
influence and popular support. Because
the economic reforms have failed to
bring prosperity and stabilize the Rus-
sian economy, many active members of
the democratic movement are looking
for answers among the conservatives
and nationalists.
Ultranationalist forces attack
Yeltsin's reforms. They hope to restore
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Russia's glory. The idea of a great Rus-
sian empire holds strong appeal for the,
masses. The emerging nationalist ideol-
ogy produces xenophobia inside Russia
andasenseofsolidaritywithtwenty-five
million Russians living outside Russia in
the former Sovietrepublics. This concern
about the violation of rights of Russian
minorities in the Baltics and other newly
formed states is shared by those in the
democratic movement. What distin-
guishes the nationalists is that they also
view Russian ethnic minorities as the
"fifthcolumn" in their struggle to restore
the Russian empire. .
Furthermore, some argue that the
entire landscape of the former U.S.S.R. is
of vital geopolitical interest to Russia.2
Yevgeny Ambartsumov, chairmanof the
Supreme Soviet's Joint Committee on
International Affairs and Foreign
In the vast territory ofwhat
used to he the Soviet Union
and its satellites, there is
clearpotentialfor many
Yugoslavia-type civil wars.
Economic Relations, has made the fol-
lowing recommendations on Russian
foreign policy: "As the internationally
recognized legal successor to the
U.S.S.R., the Russian Federation should
base its foreign policy on a doctrine de-
claringthe entire geopolitical space ofthe
former Union to be the sphere of its vital
interests ... and should strive to achieve
understanding and recognition from the
world community of its special interests
in this space."3
y eltsin is walking on quicksand. His
political rating has dropped signifi-
cantly. To stay in power he is moving
more and more towards conservative
forces. He is hoping to raise his popular-
ity by placing the issue of the protection
of minority rights of Russians on the ne-
gotiation table with other CIS and Baltic
states. More importantly, the Russian
government wishes to maintain its ever-
present influence throughout the former
Soviet Union.
Russia moves very slowly towards
the withdrawal of its troops from the
Baltic, Moldova and other regions. It also
interferes in internaI affairs of the CIS
states by sending troops to contain the
conflicts and protect the rights of the
Russian minorities. One example is the
Russian policy in Abkhazia (Georgia),
Moldova and Tajikistan. .
ABKHAZIA
The' armed confrontation between
Abkhaz and Georgian forces began be-
fore the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. Politi-
cal turmoil started when Abkhazia,
which used to be a part of the Georgian
Soviet Socialist republic, declared inde-
pendence. After the formation of the
Georgian independent state, Abkhazia
continued its struggle for independence.
However, the heterogeneous ethnic
composition of the region complicates
matters. There are 90,000 Muslim
Abkhazians livingamong500,000 Chris-
tian Georgians, Russians and Armeni-
ans in Abkhazia. They constitute only 17
percent of the region's population. The
remainder are 46 percent Georgians, 15
percent Russians and 15 percent Arme-
nians.4
Originally two parties were involved
in the conflict: the Abkhaz and the Geor-
gian National Guards. In addition, the
Abkhazian struggle attracts volunteers
from the mountain peoples of Northern
Caucasus, which is presentlypart ofRus-
sia.5The confederation of mountain peo-
ple issued an ultimatum to Georgia to
withdraw its trqops from Abkhazia and
pay compensation for the damage it
caused. If Georgia did not comply, the
confederation threatened to declare the
start of hostilities against Georgia.
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Originally Russian troops arrived in
Abkhazia by invitation from the Abkhaz
Parliament, which argued that Russia
could not remain indifferent to the situa-
tion in Abkhazia as some 90,000 Rus-
sianslivethere. The Abkhazwerehoping
that Russia wouldbeable to protect them
from Georgia's control. This invitation
played into the hands of Russian nation-
alists and those wishing to protect Rus-
sia's economicinterests there. The idea of
sending troops to Abkhazia was sup-
ported by the Russian Parliament. Rus-
sian President Boris Yeltsin told the
Russian Supreme Soviet that Russia
would not stand by while Russian citi-
zens' interests were being trampled on,
nor would Russian troops hesitate to
defend themselves if attacked. Political
observers say the Abkhaz conflict is be-
ing used by Yeltsin's hard-liner oppo-
nents in Parliament as a test of the
president's devotion to important
national causes.
Even though Yeltsin claims that the
Russian forces would maintain neutral-
ity, the Georgian State Council Chair-
man Eduard Shevardnadze accused
Russian troops of transferring military
technology to the Abkhaz forces and cre-
ating obstacles to Georgian forces. Rus-
sian troops are blocking the airspace of
Georgia in the Abkhazian region and sea
approaches. The Georgian foreign min-
ister said, "This is a clear demonstration
of the violation of the norms of interna-
tionallaw, and crude trampling on the
sovereignty of Georgia."
Yeltsin's policy is criticized both in-
side Russia and abroad. One political
observer said, "It would be ironic if the
great defender of freedom and democ-
racy was forced to enter an essentially
imperialist Soviet-style war."6
Even before the Russian troops were
sent to the region, the armed confronta-
tion in Abkhazia has claimed hundreds
of lives. Thousands of people have been
uprooted. With the Russian troops there,
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the situation has become more compli-
cated. It is expected that masses ofpeople
willbecome refugees. OnJanuaryS, 1993
Edward Shevardnadze asked the UN to
send a peacekeeping force to Abkhazia.
MOLDOVA (TRANS-DNIESTRIA)
Present ethnic conflicts in Trans-
Dniestria have long historic roots. When
Stalin masterminded the U.S.S.R., he put
delayed-action bombs against the struc-
ture, i.e., conflicts in border regions.
Trans-Dniestria is one of such places. In
the twentieth century, the area fre-
quently changed its masters. At first, the
zone was part of the Kherson Region and
then the Odessa Region (presently in
Ukraine). Duringthe CivilWar (1919-21)
it was successively occupied by Ger-
mans, Denikin's troops, French, Roma-
nians and finally by the Red Army.
Afterwards, the Tiraspol area was incor-
porated into the Odessa Region. Then it
became the Moldavian Autonomous
Soviet Socialist Republic and eventually
the Moldavian Soviet Socialistic Repub-
lie. In 1941-44 the territory was occupied
by Romania, and was included after-
wards into the Moldavian Autonomous
Republic again. However, local people
were never once asked their opinion. The
change-over was forced upon them each
time. As a result, local people of aIl ethnic
backgrounds began to hate aIl forced
changes.
The independent Moldova is seeking
its identity as a European nation, per-
haps as part ofRomania, intowhich sorne
hope to become incorporated in the fu-
ture. But this means that residents of the
strip of land along the Dniestria are again
going to be included into the Balkan sys-
tem. The Russians, who comprise a sig-
nificant part of the 800,000 people in this
area, do not lookfavourablyat this devel-
opment. Their demands for autonomy
and independence from Moldova is
fuelled by Moscow.
On June 23, 1990 the Supreme Soviet
of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Repub-
lie passed a declaration on sovereignty
and a document denouncing the
Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact as an act of
aggression and unlawful occupation of
part of Romania's territory and the Au-
gust 2, 1940 decision of the U.S.S.R. Su-
preme Soviet to establish the M.S.S.R.
Moscow was thrown into commotion.
The office of Anatoly Lukyanov (a
former Parliament speaker and one of
the organizers of the August 19 coup)
started negotiating with representatives
of the Russian and Gagauz population,
stirring their separatist feelings and en-
couraging them to create two independ-
ent republics-Trans-Dniestria and
Gagauzia.7 On September 2, 1990 depu-
ties at allieveis from the Left Bank dis-
tricts of Moldova proclaimed the
establishment of a Trans-Dniestria
Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist
Republic as part of Moldova, but with a
firm intention to remain part of the
U.S.S.R.
The first sessions of Moldova's Par-
liament, electedinFebruary-March1990,
was marked by the triumph of the na-
tionalist idea. At the Congress of the
PopularFront ofMoldova (PFM), held in
late June 1990, a resolution was passed,
which recommended that Parliament
rename the Moldavian Soviet Socialist
Republic into the Romanian Republic of
Moldova. The horror of unification was
widespread in Trans-Dniestria. On Au-
gust 25, 1991 the Supreme Soviet in
Tiraspol (Trans-Dniestria) proclaimed
the independence of the Left Bank. On
September 6 a resolution was passed on
the transfer of everything-from enter-
prises to the KGB-to the"young repub-
lie's" jurisdiction. During this time no
one on the Left Bankwas willing to nego-
tiate a new state set-up of the Republic of
Moldova. Moldova did not try to follow
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... the war in Tajikistan ... will reach beyond the boundaries of
Tajikistan because ofethnie kinships, the weakness ofstatehood
and the absence ofhorders.
the route of political negotiation and
used the diplomacy of guns.
On June 19-21, 1992 the city of
Bendery was heavily shelled. The
Bendery slaughter claimed 620 lives and
left 3,500 wounded. Thousands of refu-
gees from this region fled <'0 Russia,
Ukraine and otherpartsofMoldova. This
massacre leftaverybitterafter-taste. Fed-
eration with Moldova is completely out
of the question. At the same time, the
Russian presence in the region is ever-
growing. The 14thArmy (which is under
the Russian jurisdiction) is permanently
stationed there under the command of
Alexander Lebed, a former deputy com-
mander of the Air Force of Russia. Athis
first press conference, Lebed firmly
stated that Trans-Dniestria is Russian
land. At the beginning of October, the
"Dniestria republic" leaders in eastem
Moldova celebrated the bicentennial of
the founding of Tiraspol as a would-be
capital of a military settlement of the
Russian empire.
Trans-Dniestria intends to form its
own army with the help of the 14th
Army. Ministries ofdefence andnational
security have already been established.
The Dniestria leaders passed an edict,
imposing the Russian alphabet instead
of the Latin alphabet on the Moldovan
language of the region. Russian ultrana-
tionalist supporters of the "Dniestria re-
public" hail the progress of "this first
republic free of democrats." The Council
of Atamans of Russian Cossack Hosts,
which convened in Tiraspol, asked
Yeltsin to recognize the "Dniestria re-
public" and give it assistance, including
military.8 The Abkhazian and
"Dniestria" authorities have signed an
alliance agreement.9
By maintaining its army on the terri-
tory of Trans-Dniestria, setting up insti-
tutions (such as banks and security)
directly linked to those in Russia, and
lending moral and material support to
the Trans-Dniestria govemment, Russia
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set up a satellite on the territory to which
it has no claim, since Trans-Dniestria is
located between Moldova and Ukraine.
The artificiality of this territorial creation
has a potential for intensifying serious
ethnic, territorialand politicalconflicts in
the future.
CENTRAL ASIA
The uprooting of people in Tajikistan is
causedbyan armed conflictbetweentwo
political forces. On the one side there are
supporters of the former president
Rakhmon Nabiev, supported by the
Communist forces, whose leaders tradi-
tionally came from the economically de-
veloped northern part of the country
where Islamic influence is relatively
weak. His opposition, which seized
power from him in May 1992, is a weak
coalition of prodemocracy and Islamic
forces from the economically depressed
south, where Communism did not take
root.1ü
The first six months of the war caused
20,000 casualties.l1 It also produced a
massive displacement of people. Refu-
gees escaping the fighting in southern
Tajikistan have fled into Dushanbe, the
capital of Tajikistan. Thousands of refu-
gees from Kurgan-Tyube, the opposition
stronghold, have picketed the Russian
ambassador's .residence demanding an
end to Russian interference in Tajikistan.
According to the ITAR-TASS report of
December 31, there were 537,000 refu-
gees officially registered in Tajikistan
and around 70,000 who fled to Afghani-
stan (Radio Free Europe, January 4,
1993). This was a reaction to rumours
that the Russian forces have given weap-
onry and equipment to supporters of
deposed president Rachmon Nabiev.
Leaders of the opposing sides in the civil
war say they have no control over 20
percent of their forces.
The situation is analogous to Af-
ghanistan not only because the latter is
~ajikistan' sneighbourand its ethnic rela-
tive, but also because this strategically
important region, rich in natural re-
sources, particularly uranium, has be-
come an object of external pressure by
various groups of the Mojahedin, Irani-
ans, Turks and Uzbeks. This pressure
intensified the disintegration of Tajik so-
ciety in political and regional terms. The
northem part of Tajikistan is drawn to-
wards Uzbekistan, while the southem
region is immersed in a dvil war that is
becoming part of Afghan feuding. Rus-
sia cannot stand aloof in the Tajik con-
flict, which threatens 600,000 Russians
living in the republic and jeopardizes
Russia's interests. Therefore, there is a
strong Russian military presence there.
Sorne Russian political analysts, such
as Vladimir Kulistikov, believe that the
war in Tajikistan may have wider re-
gional implications. This war will reach
beyond the boundaries of Tajikistan be-
cause of ethnic kinships, the weakness of
stat~hood and the absence of borders.
Especially dangerous is a possible disin-
tegration of Kazakhstan, whose popula-
tion is mostly Russian. This in tum will
endanger stability in Russia itself.12
There are different interpretations of the
role of the Russian troops on the territo-
ries of Abkhazia, Moldova and
Tajikistan. Sorne feel that they play the
role of a mediator and a peacekeeping
force .13 It is my contention, however, that
to be a peacekeeping force, it would have
to include forces of several CIS members.
Yet at the present, it is comprised only of
Russian troops, which arbitrarilyassume
the role of peacekeepers, often without
an invitation and in spite of demands for
their withdrawal. Their presence con-
tributes to the escalation of the conflict
and not its resolution, and will cause
more bloodshed and displacement. lEl
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